Book Review: All Things Are Full of Gods
A Critique of Physicalism, AI, and Daniel Dennett
Hello Everyone! Welcome to Book Review Mondays at Theology in the End Times. This will be our normal Monday routine! I hope you enjoy them. These will be more than reviews in the traditional sense, placing the books in a larger conversation with contemporary relevance. Today, I cover one of my favorite, unique books recently released.
In All Things Are Full of Gods, David Bentley Hart takes on the formidable challenge of engaging with modern materialist conceptions of consciousness, offering a rebuttal to thinkers like Daniel Dennett. Hart’s philosophical critique defends classical metaphysical principles and articulately explores consciousness as a phenomenon that resists reduction to mere physical processes.
Hart’s book takes the form of an ancient dialogue common in the work of Plato and other early philosophical writers. Each personality in the dialogue is a divine being and represents an aspect of Hart’s perspective. Readers who are uncomfortable with the dialogue format might not enjoy this text.
Let’s dive in!
Hart’s Vision of Consciousness: More Than Material
Hart's key argument in All Things Are Full of Gods centers on materialist frameworks like Dennett's in accounting for consciousness. Dennett, a prominent figure in cognitive science and philosophy of mind, has famously argued that consciousness can be fully explained in terms of physical processes—specifically, neural activity in the brain. In his influential work Consciousness Explained, Dennett posits that consciousness is an illusion, a product of numerous micro-processes in the brain that give rise to the experience of self-awareness. For Dennett, the mind is a computational system with no need to invoke non-material explanations.
Hart vehemently disagrees with this reductionist approach. He positions his critique within a broader metaphysical framework that sees consciousness as fundamental to physical mechanisms. Drawing from classical theistic and Platonic traditions, Hart argues that consciousness is not merely a byproduct of matter but reflects a deeper, more fundamental reality intertwined with the divine. Hart’s exploration delves into the metaphysical dimensions of existence, suggesting that consciousness points toward participation in the transcendent, in something more than the sum of material components.
Hart’s Rebuttal to Dennett: Consciousness as a Luminous Mystery
One of Hart’s most compelling responses to Dennett lies in his focus on the phenomenological reality of consciousness. He asserts that the subjective experience of being conscious—what philosophers call qualia—cannot be adequately explained by physicalist models. Hart uses a blend of philosophical rigor and theological insight to argue that consciousness itself is a kind of luminous mystery that draws human beings into an awareness of the divine. For Hart, reducing consciousness to physical functions misses its most essential characteristic: its ability to perceive and participate in the fullness of reality.
Where Dennett sees consciousness as an illusion produced by evolutionary processes, Hart sees it as a window to deeper truths about existence. In one sense, Hart’s position can be viewed as a recovery of ancient wisdom traditions—such as Neoplatonism—that sees the mind as connected to the divine. By reintroducing a metaphysical dimension, Hart attempts to reclaim consciousness as something not only real but central to understanding the nature of the cosmos.
The Philosophical Stakes: Mechanistic Materialism vs. Metaphysical Openness
What makes Hart’s critique particularly significant is the way he frames the debate as one with profound metaphysical consequences. If Dennett is correct, and consciousness is nothing more than a biological accident, then the implications for how we view human identity, free will, and morality are starkly diminished.
Let’s take a look at these claims each in turn:
1. Human Identity
If consciousness is nothing more than a biological accident—an emergent property of neural activity—then human beings' uniqueness is diminished. In this view, what we experience as self-awareness is simply the outcome of complex biochemical reactions, much like any other biological function. This reduces the sense of human beings as special, autonomous entities with inherent value beyond their physical makeup.
In a materialist framework like Dennett’s, humans are not fundamentally different from other animals or even machines, except in a degree of complexity. Our sense of self, purpose, and meaning becomes less a reflection of any inherent worth and more a byproduct of evolution’s adaptive strategies. The spiritual and philosophical dimensions of human existence, which have long been central to our understanding of personhood, are erased in favor of a purely mechanical view.
2. Free Will
Dennett’s view also has significant implications for free will. If consciousness is entirely the result of physical processes governed by the laws of nature, then those same physical processes determine human thoughts, decisions, and actions. This leads to a deterministic understanding of the mind. If all mental states are reducible to brain states, then what we perceive as "choices" or "decisions" is the inevitable result of prior physical causes. Yet, as Hart says, there is no ability to discern how gray matter creates intention or even to see intention as an illusion. One must perceive the intention to reject it in Dennett’s illusion.
In a deterministic universe, free will becomes an illusion. We may believe we are making choices, but these choices are ultimately dictated by the interactions of neurons in our brains, which are the product of genetic and environmental influences. This view undermines the traditional understanding of free will as the ability to make choices that are not entirely constrained by prior causes.
3. Morality
If consciousness is an accidental byproduct of evolution and all human actions are determined by physical processes, then moral responsibility becomes problematic. In a materialist and deterministic framework, ethical decisions are not the result of conscious deliberation or moral reasoning but are driven by neural responses shaped by survival instincts and social conditioning.
Without free will, the basis for moral accountability crumbles. If all actions result from pre-determined physical causes, how can we hold individuals responsible for their choices? In this view, ethical judgments are less about value and more about managing behavior for survival and social cohesion.
Additionally, if consciousness is merely a biological accident, human life has no inherent moral dimension. Moral values such as justice, compassion, and dignity become arbitrary, human-created constructs rather than reflections of some deeper truth. In this case, morality is seen as a social tool for cooperation rather than a pursuit of transcendent principles of good and evil.
In essence, if Dennett is correct and consciousness is nothing more than the outcome of biological evolution, then human identity is stripped of its spiritual and existential depth. Free will becomes a mirage, and moral responsibility is severely diminished. Such a view has profound consequences, reshaping how we understand our place in the world, our agency, and the very nature of ethical life. David Bentley Hart critiques this reductionist approach, defending a richer vision of consciousness deeply intertwined with spiritual and metaphysical realities.
On the other hand, Hart suggests that consciousness reveals a participation in the divine, offering a much richer and more expansive vision of human nature.
Hart’s approach also has theological resonance. By positioning consciousness as a reflection of the divine, Hart implicitly ties his critique of materialism to a defense of religious experience and spirituality. (Such a position develops insights from his earlier work, The Experience of God) This provides a framework where the existence of God is not merely an abstract metaphysical proposition but a truth that is intimately experienced through the very act of being conscious.
A Theological and Philosophical Critique of Modernity
Hart extends his critique beyond Dennett to target modernity’s broader tendencies toward materialism and scientism. He argues that the modern worldview has systematically stripped away existence's spiritual and metaphysical aspects, reducing the world to what can be quantified and measured. In doing so, modernity has impoverished the human experience, leaving little room for wonder, beauty, or transcendence.
This critique aligns Hart with a long tradition of thinkers—from Plato to more contemporary theologians like Hans Urs von Balthasar—who resist flattening human experience into purely material terms. For Hart, Dennett represents the culmination of this materialist reductionism, and All Things Are Full of Gods offers a passionate rebuttal that reasserts the mystery and grandeur of consciousness as a signpost pointing beyond the physical.
All Things are Full of Gods: Hart’s Bold Vision for Consciousness and Theology
David Bentley Hart’s All Things Are Full of Gods is not merely a philosophical response to figures like Daniel Dennett but a profound meditation on the nature of consciousness, reality, and the divine. By arguing that consciousness cannot be reduced to material processes, Hart invites readers to reconsider the depth and mystery of their existence. For those disillusioned by the mechanical tendencies of modern philosophy, Hart offers a vision where consciousness is not an illusion but a pathway to transcendence.
However, I don’t want to stop here. Hart also uses the same logic he uses to oppose the claims of AI research and human consciousness.
David Bentley Hart's critique of AI emerges from his broader metaphysical concerns about consciousness, materialism, and the nature of the mind. Hart argues that Artificial Intelligence (AI), particularly as conceived by proponents of strong AI (the belief that machines can attain consciousness), misunderstands the nature of human consciousness by reducing it to computational processes.
Hart’s Main Critique of AI: Consciousness vs. Computation
The distinction between consciousness and computation is at the heart of Hart’s critique. Hart argues that consciousness cannot be fully explained or replicated by algorithmic processes because it is not simply a function of physical interactions or data processing. In his view, AI systems—no matter how sophisticated—are merely advanced computational tools that lack the qualitative, subjective experience (what philosophers call qualia) fundamental to consciousness.
For Hart, human consciousness is not reducible to the functional output of neural networks or algorithmic operations. He positions consciousness as non-material and deeply tied to the metaphysical and spiritual dimensions of existence. As such, any attempt to simulate or replicate it through AI would inevitably fall short because it ignores the mystery and depth of subjective experience.
Critique of Materialism in AI Research
Hart’s critique of AI also critiques the materialist philosophy that underpins much of AI research. Like his response to Daniel Dennett, Hart sees AI’s focus on replicating human intelligence through physical and computational means as part of a broader materialist tendency in modern science and philosophy. This materialist framework, Hart argues, flattens the reality of the mind into purely mechanistic terms, neglecting the metaphysical and spiritual aspects of human existence.
AI and the Nature of Personhood
Hart is particularly critical of strong AI's implications for the concept of personhood. If AI were to achieve something like consciousness (a claim Hart is highly skeptical of), it would have to share in the metaphysical reality of the soul, something AI cannot possess or replicate.
Thus, AI’s attempt to simulate human behavior or thought patterns is fundamentally limited by the absence of this metaphysical dimension. Hart would argue that even if an AI system could perfectly mimic human responses or pass a Turing test, it would still not be conscious in any meaningful sense. It would be a sophisticated machine, but not a person.
AI as a Reflection of Modern Hubris
Beyond the philosophical and metaphysical arguments, Hart also critiques the pursuit of AI as a reflection of modern hubris. For Hart, the belief that we can create consciousness or even superintelligence through technological means is emblematic of modernity’s overconfidence in human ingenuity and its tendency to view all aspects of life through a technological lens. This critique dovetails with his broader concerns about the dehumanizing tendencies of modern technology and the loss of spiritual depth in a world dominated by scientific and technological paradigms.
Conclusion
In conclusion, READ THIS BOOK! Hart speaks to philosophers, theologians, and anyone who has ever marveled at the complexity and beauty of conscious life. His critique of Dennett, AI, and the broader materialist framework is not merely academic; it is a defense of the richness of human experience and the belief that all things, indeed, are full of gods.
Blessing!